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28 
A “GREEN” LINING: CLOSING THE DOOR 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGANTS IN 
BELLON COULD LEAD TO MORE 
SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHALLENGES IN THE FUTURE 
BRIAN BIESCHKE* 
Abstract: In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of Article III standing with respect 
to environmental organizations filing suit under the Clean Air Act. The organiza-
tions alleged that Washington state agencies were required to regulate the green-
house gas emissions of five oil refineries, and that the agencies’ failure to do so 
caused particularized injuries to plaintiffs’ health and recreational enjoyment be-
cause of the impacts of those greenhouse gas emissions on climate change. Ap-
plying a three-pronged test requiring plaintiffs to establish injury in fact, causali-
ty, and redressability, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the 
latter two requirements, and therefore lacked the Article III standing necessary to 
pursue their claims in federal court. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit 
was correct in its standing analysis, and further that it might lead to new research 
into tracking the localized effects of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus open the 
door to successful environmental challenges in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many aspects of the Earth’s climate are changing rapidly.1 The evidence 
unambiguously shows that the Earth’s temperature is rising.2 The implications 
of rising temperatures are vast and diverse.3 Damage to public and private 
property due to increased flooding,4 increased vulnerability to respiratory ail-
ments and even death due to increases in wildfires,5 and exposure to food and 
water-borne diseases due to fluctuations in water temperatures,6 are just a few 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 JERRY M. MELILLO ET AL., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 22 (2014). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. at 22–23. Examples of changing trends in the Earth’s climate are decreasing snow and 
ice cover, rising sea levels, increasing extremes of heat and heavy precipitation events, and decreases 
in extreme cold. Id. 
 4 Id. at 493. 
 5 Id. at 223. 
 6 Id. at 226. 
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of the local effects of rising global temperatures that can be felt in the United 
States.7 The emission of greenhouse gases (“GHG”) into the atmosphere is one 
of many factors that are contributing to the global temperature rise.8 When 
emitted into the atmosphere, GHGs absorb heat and prevent it from escaping 
into space.9 This is known as the “greenhouse effect,” and it is one of the most 
significant causes of global warming.10 Carbon dioxide—the most significant 
GHG11—is emitted in the United States more than any other GHG.12 Among 
the various anthropogenic sources of carbon dioxide emissions are the burning 
of coal, natural gas, and oil.13 In fact, the energy sector accounted for nearly 
thirty percent of global GHG emissions in 2010.14 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to regulate emis-
sions from various sources of air pollution in an effort “to enhance the quality 
of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare 
. . . .”15 The CAA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for regulating 
the emissions of certain air pollutants.16 To achieve these standards, the CAA 
directs states to develop state implementation plans (“SIP”), which enforce the 
NAAQS, and which are federally enforceable upon approval by EPA.17 
Five oil refineries operate in the state of Washington, and each refinery 
emits substantial GHGs.18 The agencies responsible for enforcing Washing-
ton’s SIP—the Washington State Department of Ecology, the Northwest Clean 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See id. at 22–23. 
 8 Causes of Climate Change, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/
causes.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9F3Y-ZSCG. 
 9 See id.; Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied en 
banc, 741 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 10 See Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1135; Causes of Climate Change, supra note 8. 
 11 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1135; Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,499 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). “Greenhouse gases also include methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocar-
bons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, among others.” Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1135. 
 12 See Overview of Greenhouse Gases, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/ghgemissions/gases.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S8PW-
B4DP. According to EPA estimates, carbon dioxide emissions accounted for eighty-two percent of 
U.S. GHG emissions in 2012. See id. 
 13 See id. 
 14 NIKLAS HÖHNE ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ENVTL. PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 
2012, at 11 (2012), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/CQ7C-NFM2. 
 15 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012). 
 16 See Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1136 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409). 
 17 See id. at 1137 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431). 
 18 See id. at 1136. The five Washington oil refineries are BP Cherry Point, ConocoPhillips, Shell 
Oil, Tesoro, and U.S. Oil. Id. Collectively, they belong to a trade organization called the Washington 
State Petroleum Association, which, in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, successfully 
intervened as a defendant. Id. These oil refineries were responsible for approximately five-point-nine 
percent of the state’s total GHG emissions in 2008. Id. 
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Air Agency, and the Puget Sound Clean Air Agency (the “responsible agen-
cies”)19—have never applied the plan’s standards to the GHG emissions of the 
aforementioned oil refineries.20 In an effort to reduce or eliminate the refiner-
ies’ emissions, in  Washington Environmental Council v. Sturdevant, two envi-
ronmental conservation organizations—the Washington Environmental Coun-
cil and the Sierra Club (the “conservation organizations”)—filed claims in the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging a violation 
of the CAA, and seeking to compel the responsible agencies to set and apply 
certain air quality standards to the refineries’ emissions.21 The district court 
agreed with the conservation organizations that a provision in the Washington 
SIP required the responsible agencies to set and implement the standards.22 
In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, however, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the conservation organizations 
lacked standing to bring suit under the CAA because they failed to show that 
their members’ localized injuries could be fairly traced to the unregulated 
GHG emissions of the Washington refineries.23 This Comment argues that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision was legally sound and that it will avoid a flood of 
speculative environmental claims under the CAA.24 Further, it argues that the 
decision in Bellon should incentivize interested parties to invest in the scien-
tific and technological research that will unlock the remaining mysteries about 
the localized effects of GHG emissions, thus paving the way for successful 
environmental challenges in the future.25 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Washington Environmental Council (“WEC”)—a Washington state-
based environmental advocacy organization—has been trying to protect, re-
store, and sustain Washington’s environment since it was established in 1967.26 
The Washington State Chapter of the Sierra Club (collectively with WEC, the 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Id. at 1135 n.1. 
 20 Id. at 1138. Washington’s revised SIP was approved by EPA in 1995. Approval and Promulga-
tion of State Implementation Plans, 60 Fed. Reg. 28,726, 28,728 (June 2, 1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 52). 
 21 Wash. Envtl. Council v. Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1220 (D. Wash. 2011), rev’d by sub 
nom. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); see Bellon, 732 F.3d at 
1135. The responsible agencies were the Washington State Department of Ecology, the Northwest 
Clean Air Agency, and the Puget Sound Clean Air Agency. Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1135 n.1. 
 22 Sturdevant, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. 
 23 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1147. The change in the named defendant, from “Sturdevant” to “Bellon,” 
is the result of the replacement of Theodore L. Sturdevant with Maia D. Bellon as director of the 
Washington State Department of Ecology. Id. at 1135 n.1. 
 24 See infra notes 98–121 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 115–121 and accompanying text. 
 26 About WEC, WASH. ENVTL. COUNCIL, http://wecprotects.org/about-wec (last visited Mar. 10, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RFV5-MBBP. 
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“conservation organizations”) has similar priorities, such as keeping air and 
water clean and protecting wildlife and forests in Washington.27 At direct odds 
with the aspirational goals of these organizations are the industrial practices of 
Washington’s five oil refineries, which collectively produce a substantial 
amount of GHG emissions.28 EPA has announced that the combined effects of 
the six listed GHGs,29 “may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public 
health and to endanger public welfare,”30 and the Ninth Circuit has assumed 
that GHG emissions are contributing to global climate change, and specifically 
the rising global temperature.31 
As the result of rising global temperatures, members of the conservation 
organizations allegedly suffered recreational, aesthetic, economic, and health 
injuries.32 These alleged injuries range from a resident’s diminished ability to 
engage in snowshoeing due to reduced snow pack,33 to her son’s increased sus-
ceptibility to respiratory problems.34 Asserting that their members’ injuries 
were caused by the failure of the responsible agencies to set and implement air 
quality standards for the oil refineries’ GHG emissions, the conservation or-
ganizations filed suit in March of 2011 in the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington under the CAA’s citizen-suit provision.35 
The CAA authorizes EPA to establish NAAQS for a number of air pollu-
tants.36 GHGs, however, are not among the pollutants for which EPA has estab-
lished NAAQS.37 Under the federal-state scheme established by the CAA, 
Washington submitted its revised SIP to EPA, which was approved and became 
federally enforceable in 1995.38 Washington’s SIP obligates the responsible 
agencies to implement the federal CAA and ensure Washington air pollutant 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Promoting Conservation, SIERRA CLUB WASH. CHAPTER, http://www.sierraclub.org/
washington/promoting-conservation (last visited Mar. 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WUB3-
4GH3. 
 28 See Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied en banc 
741 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 29 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) 
(noting that the six GHGs “referred to in CAA section 202(a) to be the mix of six long-lived and di-
rectly-emitted [GHGs]: carbon dioxide . . . , methane . . . , nitrous oxide . . . , hydrofluorocarbons . . . , 
perfluorocarbons . . . , and sulfur hexafluoride . . . ”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1135–36. 
 32 Id. at 1140. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See id. at 1141. 
 35 Id. at 1138; see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2012). The citizen suit provision in the 
CAA allows members of the public to sue any entity allegedly violating the Act, or any agency not 
enforcing the Act’s mandates. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). 
 36 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1136. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 1137. 
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emitters comply with the air quality standards set forth in the SIP.39 More spe-
cifically, the SIP requires the permitting authority “to define [reasonably avail-
able control technologies (“RACT”)] for each source or source category and 
issue a rule or regulatory order requiring the installation of RACT.”40 The SIP 
also states that “[n]o person shall cause or allow the emission of any air con-
taminant from any source if it is detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of 
any person, or causes damage to property or business.”41 Arguing that the re-
sponsible agencies’ undisputed failure to regulate GHG emissions from the oil 
refineries demonstrated the responsible agencies’ failure to enforce either pro-
vision, the conservation organizations moved for summary judgment in July 
2011.42 
 At the same time, the Washington State Petroleum Association 
(“WSPA”)—a trade association in which all of the oil refineries are mem-
bers—successfully intervened as a defendant and filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment.43 WSPA argued that the responsible agencies were not 
required under the CAA to set and enforce GHG compliance provisions as part 
of Washington’s SIP.44 In addition to the conservation organizations’ and 
WSPA’s respective motions for summary judgment, the responsible agencies 
moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the conservations organizations had 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.45 In December 2011, 
the district court judge partially granted the motion for summary judgment in 
favor of the conservation organizations on their claim under the Washington 
SIP.46 Both parties appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, and for the first 
time, WSPA and the responsible agencies argued that members of the conser-
vation organizations did not have standing to bring their claims.47 
Agreeing with defendants, in Washington Environmental Council v. Bel-
lon, the Ninth Circuit found that the causal nexus between the conservation 
organization members’ particular injuries was too attenuated to be fairly trace-
able to the specific GHG emissions of the oil refineries.48 Therefore, the court 
held that the organizations failed to satisfy the causality and redressability re-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id. 
 40 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-400-040(1) (2015). 
 41 Id. § 173-400-040(6). 
 42 See Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1138. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See id. 
 45 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 46 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1138. 
 47 Id. at 1138–39. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a court to dismiss an action if the 
court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). An 
appeals court has “an independent duty to assure that standing exists, irrespective of whether the par-
ties challenge it.” Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1139. 
 48 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1143. 
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quirements necessary to establish Article III standing.49 Accordingly, the court 
vacated the district court’s order enjoining the responsible agencies to comply 
with the GHG provision of the Washington SIP, and remanded the case back to 
the district court with instructions to dismiss the conservation organizations’ 
claims.50 In February of 2014, the Court of Appeals denied a rehearing en banc 
on the standing issue.51 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States federal court system only has jurisdiction to entertain a 
limited variety of “Cases” and “Controversies” under Article III, Section 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution.52 Specifically, Section 2 provides in pertinent part, “[t]he 
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States . . . [and] to Controversies . . . .”53 
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted this “cases and controversies” language to 
allow organizations to bring suit on behalf of the members they represent.54 In 
Laidlaw, two environmental organizations brought claims under the Clean Wa-
ter Act (“CWA”) against Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. (“Laidlaw”), 
which operated a wastewater treatment plant in South Carolina.55 The envi-
ronmental organizations alleged that Laidlaw had discharged hazardous waste 
into a waterway in excess of the limits proscribed in its permit, in violation of 
the CWA.56 The Court held that, 
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members 
when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s 
purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested re-
quires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.57 
Prior to the Laidlaw decision, the requirements for an individual envi-
ronmental plaintiff to establish standing under Article III were outlined by the 
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.58 In that case, organizations dedicated 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See id. at 1147. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 741 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying rehearing en 
banc of Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 52 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See 528 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2000). 
 55 See id. at 175, 177. 
 56 See id. at 176–77. 
 57 Id. at 181. Therefore, an organization may only bring suit on behalf of their members if those 
members would be allowed to sue in their individual capacity. See id. 
 58 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes sued the Secretary of 
the Interior, challenging a regulation interpreting the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”).59 The Supreme Court’s opinion articulated the three “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” requirements for environmental plaintiffs to establish 
Article III standing: (1) injury in fact; (2) causality; and (3) redressability.60 
Since the Court’s decision in Lujan, several environmental cases have 
hinged on plaintiffs’ ability or inability to meet the Lujan standing require-
ments.61 In 2007, in Massachusetts v. EPA, Massachusetts and several other 
states and private organizations brought suit against the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), seeking review of EPA’s order denying the private organi-
zation’s petition for rulemaking to regulate automobile carbon dioxide emis-
sions.62 The case involved motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions that 
amounted to 1.7 billion metric tons in 1999—over six percent of world-wide 
carbon dioxide emissions.63 After determining that Massachusetts was entitled 
to a relaxed standing requirement because of its special interest as a “sovereign 
state,” the Court applied the Lujan factors and held that motor vehicle pollu-
tion amounting to over six percent of world-wide carbon dioxide emissions 
was sufficiently linked to the petitioner’s climate change-related injuries to 
satisfy Lujan’s causality requirement.64 
In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. EPA.65 Natural Resources Defense Council and 
several other environmental organizations (collectively the “environmental 
organizations”) sued in district court to compel EPA to promulgate new stand-
ards to regulate the water pollution discharges of the construction and devel-
opment industry under the CWA.66 The court partially granted the plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment and ordered an injunction compelling EPA to 
promulgate discharge standards under the CWA.67 The court also rejected de-
fendants’ contention that plaintiffs’ lacked standing and accordingly, denied 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See id. at 558–59. 
 60 See id. at 560–61. 
 61 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521, 526 (2007) (finding that Massachusetts estab-
lished injury in fact, causality, and redressability, and therefore had standing to sue for injuries from 
unregulated national automobile emissions that constituted over six percent of global carbon dioxide 
emissions); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 542 F.3d 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing that 
the causality requirement of Lujan focuses on the injury to the plaintiff, and not the environment, and 
thus concluding that environmental groups had standing where polluted waterways used by the 
groups’ members caused redressable injury). 
 62 See 549 U.S. at 497, 514. 
 63 See id. at 524. 
 64 See id. at 523–25 (holding that the rise in sea levels caused by increasing concentrations of 
global GHG emissions constituted a real harm to the state of Massachusetts that was likely to be par-
tially remedied by regulation of automobile carbon dioxide emissions). 
 65 Natural Res. Def. Council, 542 F.3d at 1253. 
 66 See id. at 1237–38. 
 67 Id. at 1248. 
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defendants’ motion to dismiss.68 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that 
the environmental organizations had standing because plaintiffs’ recreational 
enjoyment of waterways polluted by toxics was an actual injury traceable to 
construction site runoff, and was likely redressable by discharge regulations.69 
In its analysis of the causality and redressability requirements, the court ob-
served that “[w]here Congress has expressed the need for specific regulations 
relating to the environment, that expression supports an inference that there is 
a causal connection between the lack of those regulations and adverse envi-
ronmental effects.”70 Despite this observation, the court cautioned in its injury 
in fact analysis that, “[t]he injury to the plaintiff, not to the environment, is the 
relevant showing.”71 
III. ANALYSIS 
The United States federal court system is an institution for dispute resolu-
tion, but like any other such institution, it has limited resources and must regu-
late the type and amount of suits that it is willing to entertain.72 The federal 
system must weed out frivolous claims so that federal resources can be allocat-
ed to legitimate claims.73 Standing is one of the institutional barriers derived 
from the Constitution to achieve that balance.74 The standing doctrine cannot 
be disregarded just because the scientific background presented by the peti-
tioning parties was not sophisticated enough to discern the local effects of cli-
mate change caused by specific GHG emitters.75 The Washington Environmen-
tal Council v. Bellon court upheld this foundational principle, and thus rein-
forced an important and predictable precedent: access to federal courts will be 
denied to plaintiffs who cannot prove their injuries are causally linked to a de-
fendant’s alleged misconduct.76 
In deciding Bellon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the application of the three standing requirements set forth in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife to environmental plaintiffs seeking relief from localized 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. at 1248. 
 70 Id. at 1248. 
 71 Id. at 1245. 
 72 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (explaining that the purpose of Rule 11 sanc-
tions is to “discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by less-
ening frivolous claims or defenses”); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (recognizing the “prudential 
considerations” of the standing requirement). 
 74 U.S. CONST. art. III; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 75 See U.S. CONST. art. III; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 
1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied en banc, 741 F.3d 1075, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 76 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144; see supra notes 72–75 and accompany-
ing text. 
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injuries allegedly caused by the unregulated emission of greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”) by oil refineries.77 Despite finding that the plaintiffs satisfied the 
injury in fact prong under Lujan,78 the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs 
failed to satisfy the causality and redressability prongs.79 
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to reject plaintiffs’ contention that their 
members’ injuries were sufficiently causally linked or “fairly traceable” to the 
alleged misconduct of Washington’s environmental agencies (the “responsible 
agencies”).80 Even assuming that GHG emissions had contributed to global 
climate change,81 the court found that general injury to the environment is not 
enough to satisfy the causation prong of the standing test.82 The environmental 
organizations’ unsupported conclusory statements that their members’ local 
injuries were caused by the unregulated emissions of the five local Washington 
oil refineries were held to be similarly insufficient.83 The court’s understanding 
with respect to GHG emissions was that the science was not, at the time, capa-
ble of “assessing, detecting, or measuring the relationship between a certain 
GHG emission source and localized impacts in a given region.”84 Based on this 
understanding, the court reasoned that science could not discern the specific 
source of plaintiffs’ injuries from among the countless global emitting 
sources.85 The court therefore reasoned that the causal chain between the oil 
refineries’ emissions and the plaintiffs’ injuries was too tenuous to support 
standing.86 
The Bellon court next determined that the conservation organizations had 
failed to establish Lujan’s final standing requirement: substantial likelihood 
that the injury would be redressed with a favorable judgment.87 Application of 
the redressability prong requires a similar analysis to that of the causality 
prong because it depends in part on the causal connection between the injury 
and the alleged misconduct.88 The Ninth Circuit found the record was devoid 
of evidence that regulation would likely reduce the precise pollution causing 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1139; see supra notes 58–60 and accompanying 
text. 
 78 Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1141 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). None of the defendant oil refineries in 
Bellon disputed the alleged injuries claimed by members of the conservation organizations. Id. There-
fore, the court held that the plaintiff conservation organizations satisfied the injury in fact requirement 
under Lujan. Id. 
 79 Id. at 1144, 1147 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
 80 Id. at 1144. 
 81 Id. at 1135–36. 
 82 Id. at 1144. 
 83 Id. at 1142–43. 
 84 Id. at 1143. 
 85 Id. at 1144. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 1146, 1147. 
 88 See id. at 1146 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984)). 
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plaintiffs’ specific injuries.89 Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ in-
juries were likely to continue unabated even if the GHG emissions of the refin-
eries were regulated.90 
In light of the aforementioned analysis, the court remanded the case to the 
district court for dismissal.91 In sum, the Bellon case was remanded for dismis-
sal because the Ninth Circuit did not find a sufficient causal connection be-
tween specific injuries of plaintiffs’ members and the state agencies’ failure to 
regulate the GHG emissions of five state oil refineries.92 Unfortunately for lo-
cal conservation organizations like the plaintiffs, the ability to prove causality 
is limited by the current state of science and technology relating to global 
warming.93 A valid causal connection may very well have existed between 
plaintiffs’ local injuries and the specific GHG emissions of the five Washing-
ton oil refineries, but plaintiffs were still denied relief because they were either 
unable to, or failed to, provide the evidentiary support necessary to prove that 
connection.94 
Under the limitations imposed by the U.S. Constitution and years of fed-
eral precedent, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that plaintiff-conservation organiza-
tions in Bellon lacked standing was legally sound.95 Furthermore, the court’s 
decision is consistent with the policy of avoiding potentially frivolous 
claims.96 Although the decision is a practical loss for the environment, it might 
nonetheless instigate new research on the local effects of climate change 
caused by GHG pollution from particular sources, which would then enable 
environmental challenges like the one in Bellon without having a significant 
destabilizing effect on the well-settled doctrine of standing.97 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington is limited, 
by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, to hearing “cases” and “controver-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. at 1146–47. 
 90 See id. at 1147. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. at 1141–47. 
 93 See id. at 1143–44. Defendant’s expert asserted that the effect of the oil refineries’ emissions 
on global climate change is “scientifically indiscernible,” given the emission levels, the dispersal of 
GHGs worldwide, and “the absence of any meaningful nexus between Washington refinery emissions 
and global GHG concentrations now or as projected in the future.” Id. 
 94 See id. at 1142–43. 
 95 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–606 
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sies.”98 Thus, regardless of whether or not the environmental organization’s 
standing was an issue at the district court level, the Ninth Circuit properly ex-
ercised its independent duty to evaluate plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit on 
appeal.99 
The Ninth Circuit was required to dismiss the action if the conservation 
organizations failed to satisfy, with regard to their members, any of the three 
Article III standing requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in Lujan.100 
Specifically with respect to the causality requirement, the Bellon court had to 
dismiss the action because the plaintiffs failed to show that their members’ in-
juries were causally linked or fairly traceable to the responsible agencies’ fail-
ure to regulate the particular GHG emissions of the five local Washington oil 
refineries.101 Causal connections strung together in a long chain of speculation 
are often, as was the case in Bellon, conclusory, and thus insufficient to estab-
lish standing.102 The Ninth Circuit was thus bound to dismiss claims that were 
linked together piecemeal and asserted with theretofore scientifically unsup-
ported conclusory statements.103 Although it renders an environmentally re-
pugnant result, the state of science and technology being inadequate to provide 
the requisite evidentiary support for a fairly traceable causal connection—here 
between the injuries of Washington plaintiffs and the specific local emissions 
of the five refineries—is not a justification for ignoring constitutional and 
precedential limitations.104 
Restrained by the limits of contemporary science and technology, the 
plaintiffs in Bellon were unable to illustrate a sufficient causal link between the 
local emissions of the five Washington oil refineries and their members’ inju-
ries.105 Courts currently understand global warming to be a result of GHG 
emissions from innumerable worldwide sources, which mix in the atmosphere 
over time and are difficult to differentiate.106 Accordingly, in the absence of 
any contrary evidence from plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded 
that the GHG emissions of the five Washington oil refineries were indiscerni-
ble amongst the emissions of worldwide GHG emitters.107 As such, the court 
was correct in finding the environmental organizations could not prove causa-
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tion, and thus did not have standing to bring a suit alleging their injuries were 
caused by the five oil refineries.108 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs could have overcome the scientific deficiency 
in their claim by showing that the emissions of the five Washington oil refiner-
ies were significant enough to constitute a meaningful contribution to cumula-
tive global GHG concentrations.109 In so doing, plaintiffs would have been 
able to link their members’ localized injuries to general global climate change 
sufficiently enough to satisfy the Lujan causality requirement.110 In Massachu-
setts v. EPA, that is exactly what the state of Massachusetts demonstrated with 
respect to the national automobile emissions, which, at 1.7 billion metric tons 
in 1999, constituted over six percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, and 
was thus a sufficiently “meaningful contribution” to global emissions to estab-
lish causality under the Lujan test.111 
The Ninth Circuit properly distinguished the environmental organizations’ 
claims from the Massachusetts v. EPA claims.112 Although the Washington oil 
refineries emissions constituted nearly six percent of the GHG emissions in the 
state of Washington, the court properly found that plaintiffs did not provide 
any evidence to contextualize those emissions in terms of their effect on the 
larger global concentration of GHGs.113 Therefore, the court wisely chose not 
to blur the lines of the required showing of causation to establish standing in 
lawsuits, environmental or otherwise.114 
Furthermore the Ninth Circuit’s decision may encourage interested parties 
to invest in research to unlock the scientific mysteries that prevent environ-
mental organizations from succeeding on the merits of their claims.115 What 
remains is to scientifically link the emissions of specific sources to their local 
effects.116 For example, many data compilations tracking climate change are 
incomplete or inaccurate.117 Nonetheless, progress, which appears attainable, 
could help illuminate the local effects of global climate change in a more con-
crete way.118 Just like any other trend, the rate of technical progress with re-
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spect to understanding climate change can be measured.119 It is possible that, 
continuing at the current rate, “in a few generations our major sociotechnical 
systems will perform” inconceivably better than they do today.120 Thus, instead 
of investing in ultimately futile litigation now, interested environmental parties 
should consider using their own limited resources to invest in the research and 
technology that will open the gates to litigation on the merits of their claims in 
the nearest possible future.121 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Washington 
Environmental Council v. Bellon closed the doors of an Article III court on en-
vironmental conservation organizations because the organizations failed to es-
tablish a sufficient causal connection between their members’ injuries and the 
specific local greenhouse gas emissions of five local oil refineries in the state 
of Washington. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit protected the stability and pre-
dictability of a well-settled procedural doctrine: standing. Further, the court 
may well have avoided an onslaught of tenuous environmental claims prem-
ised on untraceable injuries. 
Although it is unfortunate that some legitimate and important environ-
mental legal claims might be deprived of the opportunity to be heard on their 
merits—due to scientific and technological limitations largely out of litigants’ 
control—the Bellon decision should inspire similarly situated parties to invest 
in the research necessary to scientifically connect the injuries caused by global 
warming with the global warming-causing emissions of specific local sources. 
Such information would provide plaintiffs like those in Bellon with the eviden-
tiary support necessary to establish their standing to bring substantive claims 
against such local greenhouse gas emitters. 
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